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 1 
 Visual Attention Fixes Demonstrative Reference by Eliminating Referential Luck
*
 
 
Suppose you are looking at an ordinary material thing in front of you. You think 
thoughts you would express by saying ‘That’s orange. It’s spherical. It’s moving to the 
left.’ In this case you are thinking what I shall call ‘perceptual demonstrative thoughts’: 
thoughts of the kind ordinarily made available by current perceptual contact with the 
objects they are about. This paper is about how perceptual contact with objects enables us 
to have perceptual demonstrative thoughts about them. 
The paper has four parts. §1 motivates two constraints on right accounts of 
perceptual demonstrative thought. §2 summarises some empirical results about perceptual 
attention. §3 uses these results to develop an account of perceptual demonstrative thought 
that meets the constraints. §4 gives two reasons to prefer the resulting account to its 
nearest rivals.  
 
§1 Two constraints on accounts of perceptual demonstrative thought  
 
This section proposes two constraints on accounts of perceptual demonstrative 
thought. The first part of the section states the constraints. The second and third parts 
motivate them. 
 
§1.1 Stating the constraints  
 
I begin with some necessary terminology. I shall use ‘concept’ to abbreviate 
‘representation deployable in thought’. I shall say that concept ν ‘refers to’ object o iff, 
for all Φ (where Φ is a concept of property Φ), <ν is Φ> is true iff o has Φ1. So I am 
treating reference as a relation between thought components and things thoughts are 
about. I shall use ‘perceptual demonstrative’ to abbreviate ‘concept referring to a 
particular, and of the kind deployed in thinking perceptual demonstrative thoughts’.  
In addition, I shall say that a concept’s ‘basic’ deployments are the deployments 
you must be disposed to make to count as grasping it. For example, classical inferential 
moves are often held to be basic for concepts of classical logical constants
2
. And I shall 
say that a basic deployment is ‘canonically justifiable’ iff to count as grasping the 
concept you must be disposed not just to make the deployment, but to make it on the 
grounds of a specific (‘canonical’) justification. (I am going to argue that perceptual 
demonstratives have canonically justifiable basic deployments. I leave it open which 
other concepts do too.)  
 Finally, I want to introduce the notion of justification that is ‘luck eliminating 
with respect to an object’ as follows.  
Start with this account of what it is for a justified true belief to be ‘merely luckily’ 
true: 
 
S’s justified true belief that p is ‘merely luckily’ true iff S’s justification fails to exclude 
not-p situations that it must exclude if S is to be rationally entitled to the belief (‘relevant’ 
not-p situations).
3
 
 
 2 
For example, suppose I believe that X lives in a particular house on the basis of 
twice having seen X leaving it. Suppose there is no special background in place to make 
these observations good evidence for the belief: I have simply leapt to a conclusion. Then 
if my belief is true it is merely luckily true. For, though there is a hard question about 
which situations are ‘relevant’ to rational entitlement, any plausible view will recognize 
the relevance of alternatives the subject knows to be commonplace. And I know that 
there are commonplace situations where people emerge from houses other than their own. 
So my justification fails to exclude relevant contrary alternatives. Therefore, I am merely 
lucky if my belief turns out true.  
In contrast, many philosophers regard global sceptical situations as irrelevant to 
our rational entitlement to everyday beliefs in ordinary contexts. Our ordinary 
justification for everyday beliefs does not exclude the possibility that we are brains in 
vats. But this possibility is not usually relevant to our entitlement to these beliefs. So, as 
long as your justification for an everyday belief excludes all relevant alternatives, if your 
belief is true it is not merely luckily true. And if your belief is false because you actually 
are a brain in a vat, it is unluckily false: you are ‘unlucky’ in that a situation you are not 
rationally required to exclude happens to obtain.
4
  
It is a short step from this definition of ‘merely lucky’ true belief to a definition of 
‘luck eliminating’ justification: 
 
S’s justification for the belief that p is ‘luck eliminating’ iff it excludes all relevant not-p 
situations. 
 
Justification for a belief is ‘luck-eliminating’ iff it tends towards truth, so that the 
subject is unlucky if the belief is false, and not merely lucky if it is true. Similarly, 
justification for a belief is ‘luck-eliminating with respect to an object’ iff it tends towards 
getting the object’s properties right: 
 
S’s justification for the belief that <ν is Φ> is ‘luck-eliminating with respect to o’ iff it 
excludes all relevant situations in which o is not Φ (so that S is unlucky if o is not Φ, and 
not merely lucky if o is Φ).5 
 
 Finally, we can define ‘luck-elimination with respect to o’ for the justification 
underwriting a specific move towards a belief in terms of how this justification 
contributes to the belief’s total justificatory package: 
 
S’s justification for a specific move towards the belief that <ν is Φ> is ‘luck-eliminating 
with respect to o’ iff, if S makes the move on the basis of the justification, but ends up 
with a belief whose total justification is not luck-eliminating with respect to o, some luck-
introducing fault elsewhere in S’s total justification for the belief is to blame.  
 
For example, consider an astronomer (hereafter ‘A’) taking telescope readings. Suppose 
A is justified in believing that the readings derive from a single object. A introduces a 
name, ‘Xena’, and forms beliefs she would express using ‘Xena’ by inferences like 
 
The telescope is detecting iron-richness 
                  Xena is iron-rich  
The telescope is detecting γ-radiation 
        Xena emits γ-radiation 
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A’s justification for these moves derives from her justified belief that the telescope is 
delivering information about a single object. This justification is luck-eliminating with 
respect to o iff the telescope is focused on o. For suppose the telescope is focussed on o. 
Then if A is merely lucky to end up with Xena-beliefs that match o’s properties, or is not 
unlucky to end up with Xena beliefs that do not match o’s properties, there must be a 
luck-introducing fault elsewhere in the justificatory package for these beliefs (perhaps A 
should have, but has not, checked the telescope’s reliability). Conversely, suppose the 
telescope is not focussed on o (it is focussed on o* or on nothing). Then if A ends up with 
Xena-beliefs that match what o is like this will be a mere matter of luck. 
In these terms, the constraints I want to introduce can be put like this:  
 
NON-LUCKINESS – if ν belongs to a class of concepts that have canonically justifiable 
basic deployments, ν refers to o iff canonical justification for basic deployments of ν is 
luck-eliminating with respect to o. 
 
GROUNDING – Canonical justification for basic deployments of a perceptual 
demonstrative referring to o requires perceptual attention to o.  
 
I shall suppose that perceptual attention to an object involves both selection and 
awareness. It involves selection in that attention to o both recruits information processing 
power to the extraction of information from o, and imposes a structure on the extracted 
information, for example, binding together features as features of a single thing. It 
involves awareness in that attending to an object is a way of being aware of it: there is 
something that a state of attending to an object is like.
 
(This allows for perceptual contact 
involving awareness without selection: this is the kind of perceptual contact we have with 
objects and properties in unattended peripheral vision. It also allows for perceptual 
contact that involves selection without awareness. I shall say more about both kinds of 
case in motivating GROUNDING below.) 
6
  
NON-LUCKINESS and GROUNDING entail that perceptual attention enables 
perceptual demonstrative reference because it secures canonical justification for basic 
uses of a perceptual demonstrative that is luck-eliminating with respect to the attended 
object.  
The rest of this section motivates the two constraints.  
 
§1.2 Motivating NON-LUCKINESS 
 
NON-LUCKINESS states both a necessity claim:  
 
Where ν has a range of canonically justifiable basic deployments, ν refers to o only if 
canonical justification for basic deployments of ν is luck-eliminating with respect to o. 
 
and a sufficiency claim 
 
If canonical justification for basic deployments of ν is luck-eliminating with respect to o, 
ν refers to o. 
 4 
 
I shall motivate each in turn. 
 First consider the necessity claim. Suppose this claim is false. Then ν might refer 
to o even though canonical justification for basic deployments of ν is not luck-
eliminating with respect to o. But to allow this is to allow the following combination:  
 
i) S arrives at the belief that <ν is Φ> by a canonically justified basic move. 
ii) There are no luck-introducing faults elsewhere in the belief-forming process. 
iii) S’s justification fails to exclude all relevant situations where <ν is Φ> is false. 
 
And this combination is incoherent. For suppose (iii). Then there are situations where <ν 
is Φ> is false that must be excluded for rational entitlement to the belief, but which S’s 
justification fails to exclude. So S would not be irrational to doubt that <ν is Φ>. Now 
suppose (ii). Then the possibility of rational doubt is not generated by elements in the 
belief-forming process prior to the move at (i): (ii) says that these other elements are in 
good order. Rather, the possible rational doubt concerns the belief-forming move itself. 
But (i) says that this is a canonically justified basic move. And canonically justified basic 
moves cannot rationally be doubted. Contradiction. 
So we have the ‘necessity’ part of NON-LUCKINESS: given that ν has canonically 
justifiable basic deployments, if ν refers to o then S’s canonical justification for basic 
deployments of ν is luck-eliminating with respect to o.  
Now consider the ‘sufficiency’ part: if canonical justification for basic 
deployments of ν is luck-eliminating with respect to o, ν refers to o. Suppose not. Then it 
is possible that  
 
(i) S has rational entitlement generating justification for the belief that <ν is Φ>; this 
justification is luck-eliminating with respect to o.  
 
but 
 
(ii) Something other than o’s being Φ is required for the truth of <ν is Φ>.  
 
And this combination is at best extremely implausible. For consider  
 
(iii) S ought to believe that p only if p is true. 
 
and  
 
(iv) S ought to believe that p only if S has justification that secures rational entitlement to 
the belief.  
 
(iii) states the so-called ‘objective norm’ for belief. To deny (iii) is to deny that a belief 
that turns out to be false turns out to be (objectively) wrong. (iv) states the ‘subjective 
norm’. We ought (subjectively) to form only beliefs to which we are rationally entitled 
because only these beliefs are in good order with respect to our mental economies.
7
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Now consider the following distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ regulation 
of mechanisms by norms
8
: 
 
Norm N regulates a mechanism ‘directly’ iff right functioning of the mechanism consists 
in responding to detection of the condition for N’s application by doing what N calls for 
or allows. (So if N regulates a mechanism directly, a violation of N is a malfunction of 
the mechanism.) 
 
Norm N regulates a mechanism ‘indirectly’ iff the mechanism is directly regulated by 
some other norm that is followed partly as a means of conforming to N. 
 
It is plausible that (iv) regulates our belief-forming mechanisms directly. If you 
end up with beliefs to which you are not rationally entitled, your belief-forming 
mechanisms have misfired.  
It is also plausible that (iii) does not regulate our belief-forming mechanisms 
directly. For it is plausible that there are cases of unlucky false belief: cases where a 
subject forms a belief on the basis of justification that secures rational entitlement, but the 
situation is unlucky and the belief false. And if there are such cases, they do not involve 
malfunction of our belief-forming mechanisms. Rather, they are cases where our belief-
forming mechanisms function as they should, but the world does not oblige. 
 If (iii) does not regulate our belief forming mechanisms directly, it must do so 
indirectly. So there must be a norm that regulates our belief-forming mechanisms directly 
and that we follow as a means of conforming to (iii). But we conform to (iv) directly. 
And there are no other candidates to be direct norms for belief. It follows that we obey 
the subjective norm for belief (iv) partly as a means of conforming to the objective norm 
(iii).
9
 
But this relation between (iii) and (iv) requires 
 
(v) Justification that secures rational entitlement to a belief rules out situations relevant to 
whether you ought (subjectively) to form the belief in which the belief is not true. 
 
Without (v), direct conformity to (iv) is not a means of conformity to (iii). And (i) and (ii) 
entail that (v) is false. Given (i), S has rational entitlement generating justification that 
rules out all relevant situations in which o is not Φ. But given (ii), this is not to rule out 
the relevant situations in which S’s belief is not true.  
 So the story about how belief is regulated – directly by (iv) and indirectly by (iii) -  
generates a case for the sufficiency part of NON-LUCKINESS: if canonical justification for 
basic deployments of ν is luck-eliminating with respect to o, ν refers to o. 
 
§1.3 Motivating GROUNDING 
 
GROUNDING says that canonical justification for basic deployments of a perceptual 
demonstrative referring to o requires perceptual attention to o.  
As a first step towards motivating GROUNDING, I need to say more about which 
concepts count as perceptual demonstratives. So consider again the case where you are 
looking at ordinary thing o in front of you and thinking <that>-thoughts about it: thoughts 
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like <That is orange> or <That is spherical>. Here are some observations about this 
simple case. (I intend these observations as data that will help precisify what counts as a 
perceptual demonstrative, and that a right account of perceptual demonstratives should be 
able to explain.) 
Firstly, your <that> thoughts are made available solely by your current perceptual 
link with o. If you were not currently perceiving o, some extra relation would be required 
for you to think about it. For example, you might remember it, know a proper name for it, 
or grasp a description that it satisfies. No such extra relation is required for aboutness in 
the present case. 
Secondly, your <that>-thoughts are existentially committing: you are disposed to 
move from <That is orange> to <Something is orange>. They are also ‘unified’ in the 
following sense: you are prepared to move from <That is orange> and <That is 
spherical> to <That is both orange and spherical> without needing extra reasoning to 
show that your tokens of <that> co-refer.
10
 
Thirdly, there is a close relation between your taking it that you are rationally 
entitled to make these moves and your preparedness to essay your <that>-thoughts. If you 
think you are not entitled to move from <That is orange> to <Something is orange> or 
from <That is orange> and <That is spherical> to <That is both orange and spherical>, 
you will not be prepared to essay the initial atomic <that> thoughts in the first place. It 
seems that you are rationally entitled to these moves just in virtue of the availability of 
your <that>-thoughts; the rational entitlement is secured by whatever makes the <that>-
thoughts available. 
So reflection on this simple case generates a candidate delineation of a kind of 
conceptual representation. The kind’s members are conceptual representations that are 
made available by perceptual contact with objects, where the perceptual contact with the 
object also justifies moves from <ν is Φ> to <There is something Φ there>; from <ν is 
Φ> and <ν is Ψ> to <ν is both Φ and Ψ>; and perhaps other moves that would be 
revealed by further reflection. I suggest that perceptual demonstratives are the members 
of this kind. (This precisifies my earlier claim that perceptual demonstratives are thoughts 
of the kind ‘ordinarily made available’ by current perceptual contact with the objects they 
are about. Note that I am allowing that there is perception-based reference that is not 
perceptual demonstrative reference. For example, suppose I think <He must be really 
tall>, looking at the enormous shoe of somebody I have never met. Then perceptual 
contact with one thing is enabling me to think about another. But this kind of reference – 
reference secured by ‘deferred ostension’
11
 – is not perceptual demonstrative reference.) 
This account of what perceptual demonstratives are entails that they have 
canonically justifiable basic deployments. The basic deployments are the deployments 
that characterize the kind. Canonical justification for these basic deployments is 
justification in virtue of perceptual contact. 
But why think that the perceptual contact that secures canonical justification for 
basic deployments of perceptual demonstratives must be attentive perceptual contact – 
perceptual contact involving both selection and awareness? Why will awareness without 
selection or selection without awareness not suffice?  
Consider awareness without selection first. The central case of awareness without 
selection is unattended peripheral vision. There is an ordinary use of ‘that’ associated 
with this case: ‘I’m going to ignore that’ you say, resisting the temptation to let your 
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attention be drawn by some change in your unattended visual field. But the moves that 
are automatically justified for ordinary perceptual demonstrative <that> are not justified 
for unattended peripheral <that> (hereafter ‘<pthat>’). Unattended peripheral vision does 
not bind features as features of single objects
12
. So there is no automatic justification for 
the move from <Pthat is orange> and <Pthat is spherical> to <Pthat is orange and 
spherical>. Similarly, <pthat> is not existentially committing. We do not move from 
<Pthat is orange> to <There is an orange object there>. Your expectation when you think 
<Pthat is orange> is that it may turn out that, though there is orangeness in a region of 
your visual field, there is no orange object there at all: you anticipate finding that your 
experience is caused by a trick of the light, or a streak of orange in the evening sky.  
Now consider selection without awareness. Here are two kinds of case where 
selection without awareness occurs.  
Firstly, there are cases where perceptual contact is too brief for awareness, but the 
mind nevertheless registers information derived from the thing that was (briefly) 
perceived, and registers this information with the structure characteristic of selective 
processing (for example, binding features as features of a single thing). The fact that 
information has been registered and has selective structure is shown by the ‘priming’ 
effects of the brief perceptual contact. For example, perceptual contact with a famous 
face can decrease the time it takes to recognize an associated famous face even when 
contact with the first face was too brief for awareness.
13
  
Secondly, there are cases of ‘blindsight’. Blindsight subjects have a type of brain 
damage that leaves them without conscious awareness of all or part of their visual fields 
(the ‘blank’ part is the ‘blind field’). These people are, nevertheless, able to make reliable 
forced-choice guesses about the orientation, direction, and kind of an object in the blind 
field, and successfully reach out and grab these objects when prompted to do so. So in 
blindsight there seems to be selective processing of information from objects of which 
the subject is not aware.
 14
 
Could selection without awareness generate the justification characteristic of 
basic deployments of perceptual demonstrative <that>? To see what is involved in a 
‘Yes’ answer to this question, let us focus on the case of blindsight. Suppose that a 
blindsight subject (hereafter ‘B’) introduces a term, ‘bthat’, to use in responding to 
forced-choice questions about the object in the blindfield. So in response to ‘Is it square 
or round?’ B says ‘Bthat is round’, and so on. Then to allow that the perceptual link 
underlying B’s ‘Bthat’-reports secures the justification characteristic of basic 
deployments of perceptual demonstrative <that> is to endorse the following view (the 
‘<bthat> hypothesis’). B’s perceptual link with the object in the blindfield makes 
available a demonstrative (<bthat>) whose uses it justifies. B’s responses to forced-
choice questions are expressions of thoughts of form <Bthat is Φ>. B is aware of his 
reports of <bthat> thoughts, but is not aware of the thoughts themselves. (Blindsight 
subjects claim that they are ‘just guessing’, or ‘just find themselves’ making the forced-
choice responses that they do.) Nevertheless, B’s perceptual contact with the object in the 
blindfield justifies both his <bthat>-thoughts and his ‘bthat’ utterances. So B is not really 
guessing. He just thinks he is because his condition leaves him unaware of his grasp of 
<bthat> and his justification for deploying it the way he does.  
Here is what I take to be the main argument against the <bthat> hypothesis (this is 
a special case of an old line of thought
15
): 
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(i) The intentionality (or ‘aboutness’) characteristic of thought is essentially a 
phenomenon of subjective consciousness: no mental state has conceptual content (the 
content characteristic of thought) unless the subject has or can have direct subjective 
awareness (awareness not based on inference) of being in the state.  
 
(ii) According to the <bthat> hypothesis, B’s forced choice reports express justified 
deployments of conceptual representations of which B has and can have no direct 
subjective awareness. So the <bthat> hypothesis violates (i). (B might gain access to his 
<bthat> thoughts by reasoning as follows: ‘I am disposed to say “Bthat is spherical”; 
when I am disposed to say “Bthat is spherical” there is a spherical thing in my blindfield; 
when there is a spherical thing in my blindfield I am thinking <Bthat is spherical>; so I 
am thinking <Bthat is spherical>.’ But this is not direct subjective awareness.)  
 
So 
 
(iii) A right account of perceptual demonstrative thought must rule out the <bthat> 
hypothesis. 
 
 I hasten to acknowledge that (i) is controversial. Rejection of anything like (i) is 
central to ‘naturalist’ views of intentional content. On a ‘naturalist’ view, all relations of 
‘aboutness’ are reducible to relations that can be stated in purely non-intentional, non-
mentalistic terms.
16
 For example, the claim might be that ‘aboutness’ is purely a matter of 
causal relations between physical and non-intentional states of a person’s brain and things 
and properties in the world.
17
 Or it might be that ‘aboutness’ is to be explained in 
evolutionary terms, where intentional and mentalistic notions (like belief, justification, 
and awareness) play no irreducible role in the explanation.
18
 The notion of ‘subjective 
awareness of being in a mental state’ is both mentalistic and intentional. So on a 
naturalist view, the suggestion that there is a kind of intentionality (the intentionality 
characteristic of thought) that essentially involves subjective awareness of being in a 
mental state is just wrong.  
It is obviously not possible to address the naturalism/ non-naturalism debate in a 
paper whose central focus lies elsewhere. So in what follows I shall just suppose (i). But 
to meet naturalists half-way, I point out that a central part of the proposal I am going to 
make can be excised from my own preferred non-naturalist setting and translated into a 
naturalist account of how perception secures perceptual demonstrative reference. I shall 
indicate the opportunity for the excision when it arises.  
 
§1.4 Conclusion to §1 
 
 I conclude that there are at least good initial reasons to accept both NON-
LUCKINESS and (for non-naturalists) GROUNDING. Given these constraints, the problem of 
explaining how perception enables perceptual demonstrative reference reduces to the 
following question: How does perceptual attention secure justification for basic 
deployments of perceptual demonstratives that is luck-eliminating with respect to the 
attended object? The rest of the paper answers this question.   
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2 Perceptual attention and visual objects 
 
 This section summarises some empirical results about perceptual attention. I 
should stress that I am not aiming for empirical exhaustiveness. I shall describe only 
(some of) the empirical data most relevant to the account of perceptual demonstratives I 
want to propose.  
 Recall that as I am using the term here ‘perceptual attention’ involves both 
awareness and selection. The notion of ‘selection’ itself has two components. Selection 
recruits extra information-processing to attended parts of the visual field (so that we 
typically have more information from, and are quicker to detect changes in attended 
regions). And selection structures the input from an attended region, for example, binding 
features together as features of a single object. Some instances of perceptual attention 
involve only the first type of selection: when you attend to a region of a blank wall your 
perceptual processing is devoting extra processing power to the region, but not binding 
features. Since mere enhanced processing does not bind features, it does not support the 
inferences characteristic of perceptual demonstrative <that>. So it is the richer, structure-
involving kind of selection that must underlie perceptual demonstrative reference. The 
empirical results I am going to summarise concern how the relevant structuring works.  
 Let us start with a widespread assumption: the assumption that pre-conceptual 
processing occurs, as psychologists say ‘in parallel’, while conceptual processing occurs 
‘in series’. A parallel processing system can perform multiple tasks at once without 
significant drop-off in performance, up to a point where its capacity is exceeded and 
performance collapses. In contrast, a serial processing system can perform only one task 
at once. If assigned more than one, it must cycle between tasks, with a consequent decline 
in performance. The assumption is plausible because pre-conceptual processing seems to 
have the first performance profile – level performance across increasing demands up to 
capacity – while conceptual processing seems to have the second: the more conceptual-
level tasks you attempt simultaneously, the worse your performance gets
19
.  
Now consider the following experiment (a ‘multiple object tracking’ experiment). 
Subjects are shown a display containing a number of qualitatively identical dots. Some 
dots are ‘flashed’ to distinguish them from others ((a) in the diagram). Then they all 
move randomly around the display (b). When motion stops the subject is asked whether a 
given dot flashed at the outset (c). 
 
(from Scholl ‘Objects and Attention’) 
 
To succeed at this task, you must pick out the initially cued dots and keep track of 
them over time. If either picking out or keeping track involved conceptual processing, our 
performance should be worse at tracking two dots (so when two dots flash at (a)) than 
one, worse at three than two, and worse again at four. But in fact our performance does 
not follow this pattern. We are as good at tracking two, three, or four things as we are at 
tracking one. At five the capacity seems to hit overload and fall off suddenly. This pattern 
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– uniform success up to a point where the system’s capacity is reached – is characteristic 
of pre-conceptual processing. So we can conclude that the processing involved in both 
stages of the task is pre-conceptual.
20
  
Other experiments
21
 reveal that whether performance follows the efficiency-and-
falling-off pattern characteristic of preconceptual processing depends on how the dots 
behave. For example, the pattern does not arise for dots whose motion is spatio-
temporally discontinuous (so that dots seem to leap from one point to another without 
traversing the ground between). We can track one dot or ‘thing’ behaving in this way. 
(Imagine watching an aeroplane’s shadow flicker across an uneven landscape.) But the 
capacity to track a ‘thing’ moving like this lacks the performance profile characteristic of 
non-conceptual capacities. We are much worse at tracking two jumping-around dots than 
one, and much worse again at tracking three. So tracking of dots whose spatio-temporal 
paths appear discontinuous is conceptually aided. Similarly, the non-conceptual 
efficiency pattern does not arise for dots whose motion appears to violate the boundaries 
of initially cued objects and the relations between their parts. (In the relevant 
experiments, dots seem to dissolve and flow to new locations where they reassemble.) 
We can easily track one ‘thing’ behaving like this. But we are much worse at tracking 
more than one. So when you track a ‘thing’ whose motion does not preserve boundaries 
and relations between parts, you are engaged in conceptually aided tracking. Parallel 
claims hold for ‘things’ that engage in apparent fission or fusion or apparent non-
independent motion (motion as a part of a larger whole), and ‘things’ whose sizes appear 
to fluctuate wildly over short periods.  
The visual cuing at (a) works by grabbing attention: detection of the cue recruits 
extra information-processing resources to the cued element of the visual field. And 
additional experiments show that the tracking in (b) involves maintaining attention to the 
initially cued dots. (We are much quicker at detecting gradual changes in tracked than in 
untracked dots; quicker detection indicates attention because speed of detection is 
proportional to dedication of information-processing resources.
22
)  
So the conclusion that locking on to cued dots and tracking them over time are 
pre-conceptual can be restated as a conclusion about perceptual attention. Pre-conceptual 
processing parses the visual field into units of coherence (‘visual objects’) that can draw 
and hold attention without conceptual assistance. 
Similarly, the results about how dots must behave for conceptually unaided 
tracking translate into a conclusion about the structuring of perceptual input involved in 
perceptual attention to visual objects.  
To state this conclusion, let us first introduce a distinction between what I shall 
call the ‘features detected’ and the ‘property information delivered’ through an 
attentional channel. Imagine that you are watching a coin spin slowly in front of you. 
There is an intuitive sense in which the coin’s shape ‘looks different’ as it turns: seen 
heads-on, the coin looks round; as it turns, it looks like a flatter and flatter ellipse, then a 
skinny rectangle, then an ellipse again. But there is also an intuitive sense in which the 
coin’s shape appears unchanging: your experience seems like an experience of a thing 
with a stable shape that is presenting different angles to you, not like an experience of a 
thing whose shape is unstable. I shall use ‘features detected’ to capture what appears to 
change in this kind of case, and ‘property information delivered’ to capture what appears 
to remain the same.
23
  
 11 
Given this distinction, the results about the conditions for conceptually unaided 
attentional tracking emerge as results about combinations of features that can be detected 
through a conceptually unaided attentional channel: the features detected must be 
completable by the visual system into a characteristic kind of property information. The 
location features detected (<at p at t>; <at p* at t*>) must be completable by the visual 
system into the appearance of a continuous spatio-temporal path. The size-features must 
be completable into the appearance of relatively stable size given motion at detectable 
speeds in three dimensions. The features detected when the visual object overlaps in the 
visual field with other visual objects must demand resolution by the visual system into 
the appearance of interactions between self-standing objects: appearances of collision, 
rebounding, or one thing passing behind another, but not fission or fusion. And the 
features detected must not demand completion that results in the appearance of motion 
that violates object boundaries, or the appearance that the attended thing is part of 
something larger. (This is probably an incomplete list. Further experimentation may 
reveal extra conditions.) 
The next section uses these empirical conclusions to provide an account of how 
perceptual attention fixes perceptual demonstrative reference that meets the constraints 
from §1. 
   
§3 Perceptual attention, luck-eliminating justification, and perceptual 
demonstrative reference  
 
 The first step towards the account I want to propose is to note something that is 
surely not coincidental: there is a match between the conditions for sustaining 
conceptually unaided attentional tracking and the traditional ontological category of 
ordinary objects. Here is a working definition of the traditional category ‘ordinary 
object’: 
 
An ‘ordinary object’ traces out a continuous spatio-temporal path. It moves and acts in 
ways that respect its boundaries and relations between its parts (so that usually parts that 
are adjoined at t are still adjoined at t + 1). It does not survive fission or fusion. It is not 
‘part’ of any other object in the same way its parts are parts of it. Its macroscopic 
properties are relatively stable.
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And I repeat the conditions for sustaining conceptually unaided attentional tracking from 
the end of §3: 
 
We can sustain conceptually unaided attentional tracking only as long as the stream of 
features detected demands completion into the appearance of an object that traces out a 
continuous spatio-temporal path; has boundaries that remain intact during motion; moves 
in ways that respect relations between its parts; moves independently (rather than as a 
part of something larger); does not appear to engage in fission or fusion; and has a 
relatively stable size. 
  
The second step towards the account I want to propose is to import a notion from 
the wider literature on thought and speech about particulars: the notion of a ‘file’ of 
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beliefs organized in such a way that it is a candidate to be a file about a particular (I shall 
abbreviate this to ‘object file’). An object file’s developmental path is determined by the 
incoming information directed to it, and how this incoming information is marshalled 
(the rejection of combinations taken to be incompatible; the drawing of conclusions from 
information the file already contains). In a ‘files’ framework, conceptual representations 
potentially ‘of’ objects just are files of information with appropriate organisational 
structure. And reference (a relation between conceptual representations and objects) is a 
relation between a file and the object it is about.
 25
  
Suppose that some of our object files (‘attention-based’ object files) inherit their 
contents directly from conceptually unaided attentional channels. So an attention-based 
object file develops like this (imagine that you are watching an orange ball roll away 
from you down a corridor at constant speed; at t + 1 it passes through a patch of bright 
sunlight; at t + 2 it comes to rest partially obscured)
26
:  
 
Time t t + 1 t + 2 
Features 
detected 
through 
attentional 
channel 
orange (given lighting 
conditions x), round, occupying 
a z-sized patch of the visual 
field, located at p, moving with 
velocity v 
brighter orange (given lighting conditions 
x*), round, occupying a z* sized patch of 
the visual field (for z* smaller than z), at 
p*, moving with velocity v 
orange (given lighting conditions x), half-
round (viewed from here), occupying a 
z** sized patch of the visual field (z** 
smaller than z*), at p**, stationary 
Property 
information 
delivered  
is orange, is spherical, is size s, 
is at p, is moving with velocity 
v 
is the same shade of orange, is spherical, is 
size s, is at p*, is moving with velocity v  
is the same shade of orange, is spherical, 
is size s, is at p**, is stationary 
Contents of 
attention-based 
object file 
<is orange>, <is spherical>, <is 
size s>, <is at p*>, <is moving 
with velocity v> 
<is orange>, <is spherical>, <is size s>, 
<has maintained stable colour, shape, 
velocity and size since t>, <has moved from 
p to p*> 
<is orange>, <is spherical>, <is size s>, 
<has maintained stable colour, shape and 
size since t>, <is at p**>,  <moved to p** 
from p by way of p*>, <is stationary> 
 
Then I propose the following conjecture: 
 
Conjecture – Perceptual demonstratives are attention-based object-files. 
 
(This conjecture will be turned into something more respectable by the account of 
perceptual demonstratives it enables us to provide.) 
And now consider the following toy scenario. You are trying to construct a full 
account of someone’s journey from snippets of information (‘X was in Chicago on the 
17
th
, and Butte on the 24
th
’; ‘X spent the night of the 20
th
 in Laramie’) . You are using a 
railway schedule that you know to be accurate as a guide to which routes and journey 
times are possible. As you construct your account, you use the railway schedule to justify 
your attempts to fill in missing details. (‘The only train out of Laramie on the morning of 
the 21
st
 was going to Denver, so X went from Laramie to Denver’; and so on.) Your 
justification for these moves (justification by appeal to the railway schedule) is luck-
eliminating with respect to X’s journey iff X in fact travelled only by train. For suppose 
X did travel only by train. And suppose you are careful to draw only conclusions that 
really are justified by the railway schedule. Then if you end up with a wrong account of 
X’s journey, or are merely lucky to end up with a right account, the snippets of 
information you started with will be to blame, not the moves you made by marshalling 
these snippets according to the railway schedule. Conversely, suppose X actually drove 
or rode a mule. Then even if the snippets you start with are accurate, you would have to 
be extremely lucky to end up right about the path X followed. 
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Given the story about attention-based object-files so far, we almost have a parallel 
account of how perceptual attention secures luck-eliminating justification for 
deployments of perceptual demonstratives. For attentional information processing 
completes incoming feature-snippets into property information as if the attended object is 
an ordinary object. And an attention-based object file inherits its contents from the 
property information delivered through the attentional channel that feeds it. So if you are 
attending to an ordinary object, and end up with an attention-based object-file that gets 
the object’s properties wrong, or are merely lucky to end up with a file that gets its 
properties right, it will be your feature-detection that is to blame, not the marshalling of 
features to give an attention-based object-file. Conversely, if the attended object is not an 
ordinary object, it will be as if you were using a railway schedule to construct an account 
of someone’s journey from snippets of information when in fact the person drove. If the 
attended object is not an ordinary object, even if the feature information you are detecting 
is accurate, you are just lucky if you end up with an attention-based object file that gets 
the object’s properties right. (I shall say more about attention to visual objects that are not 
ordinary objects in §4.2 below.) 
 This takes us as far as  
 
Non-lucky correctness – Suppose S has an attention-based object-file fed by an 
attentional link with ordinary object o. Then, provided that S’s perceptual information 
processing is accurate with respect to detection of features, S will be unlucky to end up 
with an attention-based object-file that does not match o’s properties, and not merely 
lucky to end up with an attention-based object-file that does match o’s properties. 
 
Now recall  
 
NON-LUCKINESS – if ν belongs to a class of concepts with canonically justifiable basic 
deployments, ν refers to o iff canonical justification for basic deployments of ν is luck-
eliminating with respect to o. 
 
NON-LUCKINESS entails that two further steps will deliver an account of how perceptual 
attention enables perceptual demonstrative reference. The first is to show that 
justification for file-maintaining moves is canonical justification for basic deployments of 
perceptual demonstratives. The second is the step from the purely causal non-lucky 
correctness to a normative parallel: the claim that justification for the moves involved in 
maintaining an attention-based object-file is luck-eliminating with respect to the attended 
object iff it is an ordinary object. 
 In fact, there is little room for argument about the first of these steps. For NON-
LUCKINESS entails that if canonical justification is undermined, reference is undermined. 
But perceptual demonstrative reference is robust in the face of factors that undermine 
rational entitlement to treat perceptual input as accurate. You can refer to a thing using a 
perceptual demonstrative even though you know that your visual system is befuddled by 
a distorting mirror and bad light, so you know that your detection of colour, shape, size, 
and location features is unreliable.
 27
 (Note that what is undermined in this case is your 
entitlement to believe <That is orange> or <That is spherical> on the basis of apparent 
orangeness or sphericality. Your entitlement to move from <That is orange> to 
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<Something is orange> or from <That is orange> and <That is spherical> to <Something 
is orange and spherical> is not undermined: entitlement to these moves is constitutive of 
grasp of perceptual demonstrative <that>.) Since reference for perceptual demonstratives 
is not undermined by factors that undermine the normative status of incoming feature 
information, canonical justification for basic uses of attention-based object-files is not the 
justification that this incoming information carries. It is justification for the marshalling 
of features that is involved in maintenance of an attention-based object file.  
 So to deliver an account of how perceptual attention enables perceptual 
demonstrative reference it remains to show how non-lucky correctness can be turned into 
a normative parallel. 
 It is at this point that the opportunity arises for a naturalist variant on the proposal 
of this paper. From a naturalist point of view, justification just is a matter of non-lucky 
correctness. So a naturalist who is convinced by the argument for NON-LUCKINESS will be 
envisaging an account of justification on which there is no distinction between 
justification that is luck-eliminating with respect to an object, and causal factors that 
secure non-lucky correctness with respect to the object. From this point of view, if NON-
LUCKINESS is true, non-lucky correctness is all that an account of perceptual 
demonstrative reference requires. 
 But suppose we want a non-naturalist account of how perception enables 
perceptual demonstrative reference. How might the step from the merely causal (so, from 
a non-naturalist point of view, non-normative) non-lucky correctness to a normative 
parallel go? 
 There is a tactic for answering this question that is thrust to the fore by traditional 
discussions of justification. These discussions have focussed on justification for belief. 
And they have shared the following starting assumption:  
 
Justification for belief – A belief is justified iff there is an appropriate dependence of the 
way the belief is formed on whether the state of affairs required for its truth obtains (or 
will obtain). 
 
Given this assumption, the debate about how beliefs are justified has been about what 
constitutes an ‘appropriate dependence’. For example, philosophers who think that 
justification involves reliability say that ‘appropriate dependence’ is at least partly a 
matter of causal dependence: justification requires that a belief be caused by a 
mechanism that will generally operate only if its truthmaker does or will obtain. Those 
who think justification involves counterfactual dependence say that a belief is justified 
only if the subject’s holding the belief depends counterfactually on whether or not it is (or 
will turn out to be) true
28
. Given justification for belief as a model, the obvious move in 
attempting to get from a claim about causal dependence to a claim about justification is to 
argue that the causal dependence, if properly described, will reveal itself as a 
justificatorily ‘appropriate’ dependence. I shall discuss a view of perceptual 
demonstratives that makes this kind of move in §4.  
But I want to suggest an alternative. I suggest that the relation between causation 
and justification that an account of perceptual demonstratives requires should not be 
modelled on justification for belief. It should be modelled on justification in virtue of 
intention.  
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 Here is an example to bring out how justification in virtue of intention works.  
 
Example: A skilled archer shoots at a target 
Robin Hood intends to shoot a willow wand stuck into the ground 200 yards away. Robin’s skills are such 
that he is easily able to hit this kind of target at this kind of distance unless conditions are abnormally 
windy. He takes careful aim and fires.  
 
Consider what justifies Robin’s aiming and firing the way he does. A right account must 
connect whatever justification Robin has with the facts that he intends to hit the target, 
and that, given his skill, he would be unlucky to fail in this intention, and not merely 
lucky to succeed. Here is one plausible proposal
29
: 
 
i) Robin intends to hit the willow wand. 
ii) Because Robin is a skilled archer, this intention selects (causes in an appropriate way) 
activation of a means of implementation that is a reliable generator of its fulfilment.  
iii) Robin’s aiming and firing the way he does are justified because they are non-luckily 
selected non-lucky generators of fulfilment of his intention (so he will be unlucky to fail 
and not merely lucky to succeed). 
 
According to i-iii, Robin’s movements as he aims and fires are justified because they are 
selected by his intention as a non-lucky route to its fulfilment. But this normative story 
incorporates a purely causal story about visuo-motor information-processing. Robin’s 
visuo-motor system is enacting a routine of input and output (perceptual inputs x 
determine parameters for action y). The normative story depends on this purely causal 
story (it is the parameter-setting mechanism that gives Robin a reliable method of hitting 
the target). But the information processing story is not itself normative. It is just a story 
about causal input and caused output. The whole package becomes normative only when 
we factor in Robin’s intention to hit the target. Robin intends to hit the target; this 
intention selects a perceptual-input-action-output routine; given the intention, the 
movements produced by this routine are justified because they are non-luckily selected 
non-lucky generators of fulfilment of the intention. 
I suggest that the relation between the causal story about formation of attention-
based object files (the story that gets us as far as non-lucky correctness) and justification 
for uses of perceptual demonstratives should be understood along these same lines. On its 
own, the story about generation of attention-based object files is merely causal. The 
package becomes normative when we factor in what I shall call our ‘representational 
intentions’. The mind intends to reach out to the world in thought. The moves involved in 
maintenance of attention-based object-files are ‘justified’ in that they are non-luckily 
selected non-lucky generators of fulfilment of representational intention.  
The rest of the section provides the main details of this view. The last section 
shows why I think it should be preferred to its nearest rivals. 
First let me clarify the notion of ‘representational intention’. There is an obvious 
initial objection to accounts of perceptual demonstratives that appeal to an ‘intention to 
represent’. For it is plausible that perceptual demonstratives are ‘basic’ in the following 
sense: grasp of a perceptual demonstrative referring to o does not depend on grasp of any 
other conceptual representation of o, or on any conceptual specification of a domain of 
which o is a member
30
. But intentions are normally taken to be propositional attitudes. 
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And if a representational intention is a propositional attitude, its content must be specified 
either by <I intend to represent…> (where the gap is filled by a conceptual representation 
of a thing) or <I intend to represent something (some thing outside the mind) >. 
Assuming the first option, grasp of a perceptual demonstrative rests on grasp of some 
other conceptual representation of its referent. Assuming the second, grasp of a 
perceptual demonstrative rests on the capacity for conceptual specification of the domain 
of mind-independent things. So neither option respects the basic status of perceptual 
demonstratives. 
However, this objection arises only on the assumption that representational 
intentions have propositional content. And I want to suggest that they do not. I suggest 
that representational intentions belong to a class of non-propositional motivational states. 
This is the class of basic psychological needs or compulsions. Some other members of 
this class (not all shared, or shared to the same extent, by all agents) are the need to avoid 
loneliness; the compulsion to act aggressively; the need to conform; the need not to 
conform; the need to feel secure.  
Here are three reasons to think that these needs or compulsions do not have 
propositional content. 
Firstly, having a need does not require grasp of the concepts that figure in a 
canonical account of what it is to have it. For example, you can need to feel secure 
without grasping the concept of security. This is a defining characteristic of non-
conceptual or non-propositional content.
31
 
Secondly, there is no pressure towards saying that needs have propositional 
content to explain how we come by them. Beliefs are often arrived at by rational 
deliberation. And it is hard to explain this fact unless we suppose they have propositional 
content. But we do not arrive at basic psychological needs as a result of rational 
deliberation. So the parallel pressure does not arise.  
Thirdly, there is no pressure towards saying that a need has propositional content 
to explain what it would take to fulfil it. A desire has determinate propositional content 
insofar as it is a desire that some specific state of affairs (or perhaps some simple 
disjunction of states of affairs) come about. But a basic psychological need does not 
determine a specific action, event or state of affairs that would fulfil or relieve it (there is 
no telling in advance what will relieve X’s loneliness, or what outlet Y’s aggression will 
find).
32
  
The basic psychological needs I have listed so far are emotional needs: needs we 
have in virtue of the fact that we are emotional beings. But having recognized emotional 
needs, it is hard to see grounds for resisting the claim that there are also rational needs: 
needs we have in virtue of the fact that we are rational beings (and the having of some of 
which is constitutive of rationality). Some philosophers’ accounts of our rational lives 
already appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to rational needs or compulsions: the need to 
understand oneself
33
; the need to avoid epistemic blame
34
; the compulsion to make basic 
inferential moves when presented with simple premisses
35
. I suggest that representational 
intention is a basic rational need: the mind has a basic, non-propositional, need to 
represent things outside itself. (To avoid quibbling about whether a mental state of this 
kind is an intention, from now on I shall say ‘need to represent’ rather than 
‘representational intention’.) 
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With the notion of the basic need to represent in place, the account I want to 
propose of how perceptual attention enables perceptual demonstrative reference can be 
set out as follows.  
 
(i) The mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself.  
 
(ii) This need selects formation of attention-based object-files as a means to its fulfilment. 
 
(iii) The moves involved in maintaining an attention-based object-file are (weakly) 
justified in that they are selected as a means to fulfilment of a basic cognitive need. 
 
(iv) Given non-lucky correctness, the justification at (iii) is luck-eliminating with respect 
to the attended object iff it is an ordinary object.  
 
So 
 
(v) Given NON-LUCKINESS, an attention-based object-file refers to the attended object iff 
it is an ordinary object.  
 
But 
 
(vi) Most of the time if you form an attention-based object-file the attended object is an 
ordinary object. (I defend this claim immediately below.) 
 
v and vi entail  
 
(vii) Formation of an attention-based object-file is a reliable fulfiller of representational 
intention.  
 
(viii) Given vii, we can recognise a richer sense in which the moves involved in 
maintaining an attention-based object-file are justified: these moves are (richly) justified 
because they are non-luckily selected non-lucky generators of fulfilment of the basic need 
to represent. 
 
To see why (vi) should be accepted, think of what it is like keeping visual track of 
a ripple across the surface of a lake or a raindrop running down a window. Attention can 
be drawn to such things without conceptual guidance (detection of motion is a very 
common attentional ‘cue’). But most ripples and raindrops do not move in ways that 
respect stable boundaries. And ripples and raindrops routinely split apart and fuse with 
other ripples and raindrops. Tracking a ripple or a raindrop as it behaves like this involves 
a host of (little, unarticulated) decisions about where the boundaries of the thing are, or 
which fission product to keep attending to. These decisions involve conceptual 
processing. So, in most cases, attentional tracking of a ripple or raindrop (or other visual 
object that is not an ordinary object) is conceptually aided attentional tracking. Now 
suppose that your attention is caught by a visual object that it is not an ordinary object. 
Most of the time, the visual object will display its non-ordinary-objecthood almost 
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immediately. And when non-ordinary-objecthood is displayed, you will either lose track 
of the thing (your attention will wander elsewhere) or you will begin to devote conceptual 
resources to tracking it. In the first kind of case, the attentional link is too short-lived for 
an attention-based object-file to be formed. In the second, the resulting object file is not 
an attention-based object file. For, by definition, an attention-based object file inherits its 
contents from the information delivered by a conceptually unaided attentional link.  
i-viii give us what the GROUNDING + NON-LUCKINESS framework from §1 requires: 
an account of how perceptual attention secures justification for basic uses of a perceptual 
demonstrative that is luck-eliminating with respect to the attended object.  
 
§4 Good consequences 
 
I shall close with two points of comparison between the account I have proposed 
and nearby alternatives. The comparisons concern the elements of the account that I think 
others are most likely to find problematic: the appeal to representational needs, and the 
treatment of attention to visual objects other than ordinary objects. 
 
§4.1 Classical normativity, practical normativity, and selection without awareness 
 
Consider the contrast between justification for belief and justification in virtue of 
intention: 
 
Justification for belief – A belief is justified iff there is an appropriate dependence of 
formation of the belief on whether the state of affairs required for its truth obtains. 
 
Justification in virtue of intention – A behaviour is justified iff it depends in an 
appropriate way on an intention (it is a non-luckily selected non-lucky generator of the 
intention’s fulfilment). 
 
Both kinds of justification involve a non-lucky relation between a mental state and a way 
the world is. But these relations have opposite directions of orientation. In the belief case, 
the orientation is, as I shall say, ‘classical’: it runs from a way the world might be 
(namely, such that the belief’s truthmaker obtains) to the formation of the mental state. In 
the intention case the relation is ‘practical’: it runs from the mental state (the intention) to 
the state of affairs that fulfils it.
36
  
 I have suggested that the justification for basic uses of perceptual demonstrative 
<that> secured by perceptual attention has practical orientation: basic deployments of a 
perceptual demonstrative are canonically justified in virtue of the fact that they are 
selected by the basic need to represent as a means to its fulfilment. 
 Though it is not possible to attempt a survey here, I think it is fair to say that 
every other extant view of perceptual demonstratives that respects the kind of concerns 
about normativity made explicit by NON-LUCKINESS favours a classical orientation. For 
example, consider the following recent proposal.
37
 
Suppose you are attending to an ordinary object in front of you. Your attentional 
link with the thing provides a stream of information derived from it. Because you are 
receiving this information through an attentional channel, you respond by forming 
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perceptual demonstrative beliefs. Your attentional channel provides input information 
about location, shape, and so on. You respond by forming beliefs like <That is about a 
foot in front of me> and <That is spherical>. You might also respond by forming a 
perceptual demonstrative intention (<I am going to pick that up>). If you do form such an 
intention, your attentional link determines how you will reach out in the attempt to 
execute it. So your attentional link underpins a basic pattern of informational input to 
cognition, and output from cognition to action. This ‘underpinning’ is both causal and 
normative. It is causal because your attentional link causes you to form the beliefs you 
do, and combines with your intention to cause you to reach out distance x with your grip 
adjusted in manner y. It is normative because your attentional link determines standards 
of right functioning for your input-to-cognition and output-to-action information 
processing. If you are attending to o, right input-to-cognition information processing 
results in accurate beliefs about what o is like, and right output-to-action information 
processing generates actions on o. (To attend to o just is to stand in a relation to o that 
generates these standards of right functioning.) So perceptual attention provides 
normative underpinning for the input-to-cognition/output-to-action pattern that it causes: 
it provides standards for assessing this information processing pattern as going right or 
wrong.
38
 (Recall the telescope example from §1. The fact that a telescope is focused on o 
provides a standard for assessing whether it is delivering accurate information: it is 
delivering accurate information iff it is getting o’s properties right. If the telescope is not 
focused, there is no standard for assessing the accuracy of the information it delivers. 
This view treats the role of perceptual attention in securing perceptual demonstrative 
reference as a parallel to the role of ‘focus’ in securing the ‘aboutness’ of beliefs formed 
on the basis of information delivered through a telescope.) 
Though these are not the terms in which it was initially stated, this proposal fits 
the GROUNDING + NON-LUCKINESS framework. For the proposed account of why attention 
suffices to fix reference  – attention plays a role parallel to the role played by focus in the 
telescope case – also entails that attention secures justification that is luck-eliminating 
with respect to the attended object. This justification has a classical direction of 
orientation because justification in virtue of focus is justification in virtue of tending 
towards getting an object’s properties right.  
Why prefer the (practical) view I have proposed to the ‘focus’ view and other 
classical accounts? A full discussion of this question is not possible here. But I want to 
suggest one argument in favour of the practical view: it offers a better account of the 
status of merely selective perceptual processing. (Recall that attentive processing is both 
selective and awareness-generating. Merely selective processing shares the structure of 
attentive processing but does not generate awareness.) 
To see how the practical view treats merely selective processing, it is helpful to 
add another layer to the parallel between essaying perceptual demonstrative reference and 
shooting at a target. Consider the following example 
 
Example: Robin Hood shoots under hypnosis 
Robin has been hypnotized to shoot at something red every time he hears a whistle. Robin’s skills as an 
archer remain intact. So each time he hears a whistle he shoots an arrow, and this arrow usually hits a red 
thing. 
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On the face of things, Robin’s aiming-and-firing motions here are not justified. The story 
about why he moves as he does is a mere causal story: the hypnosis and the whistle cause 
activation of a perceptual-input/action-output routine. This is the same information 
processing routine as is selected when Robin shoots intentionally. But in the hypnotized 
case the routine is not embedded in a wider normativity-conferring setting: Robin’s 
movements are not justified because they are not part of a causal routine that has been 
selected as a non-lucky generator of fulfilment of his intention.
39
 
On the practical view, the reason perceptual attention suffices for perceptual 
demonstrative reference while mere selective processing does not should be understood 
along the same lines. The causal routine for formation of attention-based object files may 
be intact in a mere selective case. But this causal routine has no normative status on its 
own. It gains normative status when it is harnessed by representational intention as a 
means to its fulfilment. Attention is essential to canonical justification for basic 
deployments of perceptual demonstratives because mere selective information processing 
(as opposed to attentive information processing) does not deliver awareness, so is not 
harnessable by representational intention.
40
 
Now compare this with the account of the status of merely selective processing 
generated by the classical ‘focus’ view. On this view, perceptual attention suffices to fix 
perceptual demonstrative reference because an attentional link is a focused link. So 
someone taking this view who wants to uphold GROUNDING must maintain that perceptual 
information processing that does not generate awareness is not genuinely focused. For 
example, you might argue as follows. Perceptual attention to o generates a rich range of 
capacities with respect to o: capacities to report o’s (apparent) properties; to try to find 
out what o is like; and to act on o. In contrast, a merely selective perceptual link, like the 
link a blindsight subject has with an object in the blindfield, generates a very 
impoverished range of capacities. But it is the richness found in the case of perceptual 
attention that warrants the claim that perceptually attending to o is ‘focusing’ on o, so that 
perceptual attention to o can be said to set standards of correctness for the information 
processing associated with it. Given the comparatively tiny range of capacities generated 
by the blindsighter’s perceptual contact with an object in the blindfield, there are no 
grounds for saying that the blindsighter has a perceptual link that is ‘focused on’ the 
object: this would be like saying that a photo-electric cell is ‘focused on’ a light-source 
that activates it.
41
 
One problem with this move is that it is vulnerable to an as yet unexcluded 
empirical possibility: there might turn out to be a form of merely selective processing that 
mirrors the richness in capacities generated by perceptual attention. 
A second problem is that many cases of attentive processing do not generate 
richer capacities with respect to an object than mere selective processing might. Suppose 
you are attending to a thing visible merely as a speck in the sky. In this case, your 
capacities to make justified reports on the basis of your attentional link are very limited. 
You might be able to report only the thing’s apparent location – something a blindsight 
subject can also do. Similarly, your attentional link does not put you in a position to try to 
find out what the thing is like. And it does not enable you to act on the thing in any sense 
in which a blindsight-link cannot: you can point at the object, or walk towards it, but so 
can a blindsight subject. So the suggestion would have to be that perceptual attention to o 
counts as focus on o in virtue of the fact that attention to a thing ‘potentially’ generates a 
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rich range of capacities. But now there is a hard problem about why a mere selective link 
does not ‘potentially’ generate a rich range of capacities too.  
I do not want to deny that an advocate of the ‘focus’ model might find a more 
plausible account of why perceptual processing that does not generate awareness is not 
really focussed.
42
 Rather, my point is that on the practical view the need for such an 
account does not arise.  
To bring out the importance of this point, let us go back to the claim that 
motivated GROUNDING in §1.3: 
 
(i) The intentionality characteristic of thought (conceptual intentionality) is essentially a 
phenomenon of subjective consciousness. 
 
It is an old observation
43
 that this claim is consistent with 
 
(ii) Intentionality has a physical basis (a mental state with intentional content just is a 
physical state with intentional content). 
 
All that is required to maintain both (i) and (ii) is  
 
(iii) Any physical state that has conceptual content is a subjectively conscious state. 
 
Now suppose  
 
(iv) Perceptual contact with objects and properties in the world secures conceptual 
content because it secures justification for deployment of perception-based concepts. 
(NON-LUCKINESS is a special case of this claim.) 
 
Finally, suppose a classical direction of orientation for this justification: 
 
(v) Perception secures justification for deployments of perception-based concepts 
because it generates appropriate dependence of the way these concepts are deployed on 
what the world is like. 
 
(v) and (iii) entail 
 
(vi) A perceptual link that secures ‘appropriate dependence’ of deployments of 
perception-based concepts on what the world is like also generates awareness. 
 
So to keep (i), (ii), (iv) and the classical orientation (v) you must find a difference 
between the ‘appropriate dependence’ at (vi), and whatever dependence merely selective 
processing might secure for tokenings of sub-personal states. And it is going to be hard to 
find this difference. For it is hard to see what might count as a ‘way of securing 
dependence’ that might not be present at the sub-personal level.  
 The practical view I have proposed offers a different and, I think, better account 
of why merely selective processing cannot secure conceptual intentionality. On this view, 
there is no need to look to structural differences between perceptual processing with 
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awareness and perceptual processing without for an explanation of the normative 
difference between perceptual attention and merely selective perceptual contact. Rather, 
the difference lies with whether the information processing involved in the perceptual 
link can be harnessed to the mind’s basic need to represent.  
 
§4.2 Perceptual demonstrative reference failure and perception as the source of the basic 
subject matter of thought 
 
 The second point of comparison with nearby proposals that I shall consider 
concerns essayed perceptual demonstrative reference where the attended visual object is 
not an ordinary object but a ripple, a shadow, a mereological griffin consisting in two 
ordinary objects that the visual system is treating as one, or some other spurious ‘thing’. 
The practical view entails that in such cases reference fails. Essaying perceptual 
demonstrative reference in these cases is like using a railway schedule to construct an 
account of a journey given snippets of information, when in fact the person drove. In this 
case, your justification for your operations on the incoming snippets is not luck-
eliminating with respect to the journey. Similarly, on the practical view, when you essay 
perceptual demonstrative reference to a visual object that is not an ordinary object, your 
file-maintaining moves are justified (because they are selected by representational need 
as a generator of its fulfilment). But this justification is not luck-eliminating with respect 
to the attended object. So (given NON-LUCKINESS) your attempt to refer does not succeed. 
Of course, we do refer to ripples, shadows, and so on on the basis of perceptual 
links. But on the practical view this is not (pure) perceptual demonstrative reference. It is 
conceptually aided or ‘complex’ demonstrative reference based on perception. I have 
argued that almost all attentional tracking of non-ordinary-objects is conceptually aided. 
And an object-file formed on the basis of a conceptually aided attentional link is not an 
attention-based object file. It is a conceptual representation whose basic deployments are 
justified partly by the relevant conceptual processing, and which has its own reference-
fixing story (which I cannot consider here). It is only where your visual system is taken in 
by a non-ordinary object behaving with enough ordinary-object-like coherence for 
conceptually unaided tracking that you will essay a pure perceptual demonstrative that 
fails to refer.  
There is an old
44
 and intuitive model of the importance of perceptual 
demonstrative reference against the background of which this consequence about 
reference failure emerges as a virtue. To motivate the model, consider the following 
argument. 
 
(i)  Our grasp of what it takes for a general proposition to be true is derived from our 
grasp of what is required for the truth of its potential particular instances: knowledge 
what is required for <Something is Φ> to be true rests on knowledge what is required for 
the truth of <ν is Φ>. 
 
(ii) Chains of ‘derivation’ of the kind mentioned in (i) must come to an end in a range of 
‘fundamental’ propositions, where if p is a proposition in this range, knowledge what it 
takes for p to be true is not derived from knowledge what it takes for any other 
proposition to be true. (Otherwise our knowledge what it takes for propositions to be true 
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will never bottom out in knowing that p is true iff the world is such-and-such way. And in 
that case our thought will have no subject matter.)  
 
But (i) entails that these fundamental propositions cannot be general propositions. So 
 
(iii) There must be a fundamental range of particular propositions: a range of propositions 
of form <ν is Φ> such that grasp of ν does not require grasp of any other conceptual 
representation of ν’s referent, and does not require grasp of any general proposition. 
 
This argument leaves us with three options: reject (i); reject (ii); or identify the 
fundamental range of propositions and explain how we are able to grasp them. The only 
serious contender with respect to the third option is the claim that the fundamental range 
of particular propositions is the range of propositions grasp of which would involve 
thinking a perceptual demonstrative thought. Pursuing this option, we get  
 
(iv.a) For perceptual demonstrative <that>, and observational concept <Φ>, grasp of 
<That is Φ> is basic: it does not rest on grasp of any more fundamental way of 
identifying the referent of <that>, or on grasp of any general proposition. 
(iv.b) Grasp of the simplest propositions of form <Something is Φ> consists in knowing 
that <Something is Φ> is true iff <That is Φ> is true for some potential instance of 
perceptual demonstrative <that>.  
 
(iv.a) and (iv.b) state the old model of the importance of perceptual demonstratives: 
perceptual demonstratives provide the basic subject matter of thought.  
 Now add a consequence of the classical ‘focus’ view: 
 
(v) The reach of potential demonstrative reference is the reach of potential attentional 
tracking (so that if o can draw and hold attention, o can be the object of perceptual 
demonstrative reference). 
 
Finally, add an apparent consequence of the empirical data from §2: 
 
(vi) We can keep attentional track of any ‘thing’ that appears to behave with ordinary-
object-like coherence. 
 
Given (v) and (vi), the class of potential objects of demonstrative reference includes any 
‘thing’ that can appear to behave with ordinary-object-like coherence for long enough to 
engage attentional tracking. This class includes at least the following: ordinary objects, 
shadows; ripples; reflections; dots or marks on surfaces; parts of ordinary objects; parts 
of ripples and reflections; mereological griffins. But according to (iv.b) our grasp of a 
general proposition like <There is something square in this room> is to be explained in 
terms of our grasp of its potential perceptual demonstrative instances. So (v) and (vi) 
entail that it is far too easy for <There is something square in the room> to be true. All it 
takes is for there to be some perspective from which some square visual object can grab 
attention. For example, <There is something square in the room> will come out true if no 
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ordinary object is square, but there is some perspective from which a subject would be 
able to attend to a square mereological griffin.  
To retain (i) and (ii) while avoiding this absurd result we must reject either (v) or 
(vi). 
The classical ‘focus’ view entails (v). So a proponent of this view who wants to 
keep (i) and (ii) must reject (vi). But it is hard to see how this move could be sustained. 
To reject (vi) you must deny that we really do keep attentional track of non-ordinary 
objects (so that when your visual system is locked to a ‘thing’ that is in fact a shadow or a 
ripple, the information processing story is different from the story for a visual lock on an 
ordinary object). But our perceptual systems are sensitive to how objects behave in the 
actual world, not how they behave in nearby possible worlds. So as long as a ‘thing’ is in 
fact behaving with ordinary-object-like coherence, it will be treated by the perceptual 
system as an ordinary object. There is no plausibility to the claim that two processes 
(attentional tracking of ordinary objects on the one hand, whatever you want to call the 
process on the other) lock onto the same kind of coherence in the same ways.
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In contrast, the view I have proposed entails that if (vi) is true (v) is false. So it 
allows us to reclaim the old model of perceptual demonstrative reference as providing the 
basic subject matter of thought: grasp of perceptual demonstrative <that> does not rest on 
grasp of any other conceptual representation of the thing you are thinking about; the 
domain of our most basic quantifiers is defined by the reach of potential perceptual 
demonstrative reference.  
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1
 ‘<ν is Φ >’ abbreviates ‘The proposition constructed from ν and Φ’. 
2
 Peacocke 1992 ch. 1; Campbell 2002 ch. 5 §5. 
3
 Compare Pritchard 2007 §2; Hiller and Neta 2007 §1. 
4
 This parallels Lewis’s response to scepticism in his 1996 (see esp. 559). But Lewis’s  
concern is knowledge, not rational entitlement. So he is dealing with a different notion of 
‘relevance’. For example the actual situation is always relevant to knowledge, but is 
sometimes irrelevant to rational entitlement (otherwise there could be no unluckily false 
beliefs). 
5
 I am supposing that justification can ‘exclude’ only situations that are potentially 
relevant to rational entitlement. So my rational entitlement generating justification for 
believing <Jack is not tall> is luck-eliminating with respect to Jack, but not with respect 
to the number 7: given my justification, there are no unexcluded relevant situations in 
which 7 is tall, but my justification does not exclude any such situations because there 
were none to begin with.  
6
 This classification of perceptual processes into attentive, merely selective, and merely 
awareness-generating owes its structure to Dehaene et. al. 2006. Some philosophers and 
psychologists use ‘perceptual attention’ more broadly, counting all selective perceptual 
processing as attentive processing. Nothing in this paper depends on how this 
classificatory matter should be resolved. 
7
 Compare Boghossian 2008a 99-101. 
8
 This distinction derives from Boghossian 2008a 101. 
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9
 For the same conclusion established by different arguments, see Boghossian 2008a 101; 
Velleman 2000a 245-246, 252-255.  
10
 This is not to deny that there can be informative identities involving perceptual 
demonstrative <that>. The point is just that in an ordinary case where you use two tokens 
of <that> to refer to a thing you are keeping track of in perception the identity is not 
informative. I discuss informative identities involving perceptual demonstratives in my 
2010 §3.2.  
11
 So-called by Evans 1982 150-151. 
12
 See Palmer 1999 §11.2.6 and compare Campbell 2002 31-33. 
13
 See Palmer, 1999 §13.3.2 for a textbook account and references. 
14
 Weiskrantz 2009. 
15
 Searle 1994 contains an extended defence of a stronger version of (i): the claim that all 
intentionality is a phenomenon of subjective consciousness. See especially 156-159. See 
also Searle 1980. Unlike Searle, I allow that sub-personal states might have a kind of 
intentionality distinct from the intentionality characteristic of thought. The (i)-(iii) 
argument is indebted to Campbell 2002 7-10, 142-145. 
16
 For this definition of ‘naturalism’ see Searle 1994 49-52; Fodor 1990 51-52 and note 3. 
17
 Fodor 1990.  
18
 Kornblith 2002. 
19
 See for example Palmer 1999 554. 
20
 Pylyshyn 2003 §5.3.1, 2007 34-58; Scholl 2001a §2.5, 2007. 
21
 Scholl 2001a §6, 2007 §4; Scholl et. al. 2001.  
22
 Scholl 2001a 10 gives a summary and references. 
23
 For a basic account of this topic see Palmer 1999 ch. 7. In the terms Palmer uses at 
313, I am using ‘features detected’ to describe ‘proximal’ aspects of perceptual 
experience and ‘property information delivered’ to describe ‘distal’ aspects. 
24
 Compare Ayers 1991. The proposal that follows in fact provides a way to refine the 
account of the category of ordinary objects. I discuss this further in my 2010 §2.3. 
25
 For recent uses of the ‘files’ framework see Evans 1982; Recanati 1993; Lawlor 2001; 
Jeshion 2001. Nothing I say here supposes that the notion of a file is prior in order of 
explanation to the notion of grasp of coreference (see Fine 2007 67-68 for an objection 
on this score; Lawlor 2001 63, 79-80 for what I take to be the right reply). 
26
 The proposal I want to make can accommodate some adjustments with respect to 
detail. For example, nothing I say here depends on whether shape features detected are 
three-dimensional or (as I suggest in row 1 of the table) two-dimensional. And nothing 
depends on exactly how much of the contents of an attention-based object file at t is 
incorporated into the file at t + 1. 
27
 For similar claims see Campbell 2002 §5.7; Evans 1982 179.  
28
 A counterfactual model of justification combines Nozick’s account of knowledge as 
true belief that tracks the truth (1981 172-178) with the claim that the justification is 
whatever a true belief must have to count as knowledge. 
29
 This is modelled on Anscombe’s 2000 account of the relation between an intention and 
its fulfilment. Anscombe says that if I intend to Ψ I believe that I will Ψ, and if I actually 
do Ψ my intention counts as knowledge iff it is appropriately connected to the action that 
fulfils it. But she distinguishes ‘practical’ from ‘speculative’ knowledge. A true belief 
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counts as ‘speculative’ knowledge iff it depends appropriately on its truthmaker; a 
fulfilled intention counts as ‘practical’ knowledge iff it plays an appropriate role in 
bringing its truthmaker about: ‘Practical knowledge is “the cause of what it understands”, 
unlike “speculative” knowledge, which is “derived from the objects known”’(87). See 
also 51-53; 57. This reading of Anscombe is indebted to Velleman 2007a xxi-xxv and 
2007b . 
30
 I argue for this ‘basicness’ claim in §4.2. The claim also follows from the ‘no extra 
relation’ datum from §1.3. 
31
 See, for example, Peacocke 1992 ch. 3. 
32
 Compare Velleman 2006 315-316.  
33
 Velleman 2000 20-24; 2007a xx. 
34
 Boghossian says that the most basic inferences transmit warrant in virtue of 
instantiating epistemically ‘blameless’ patterns (2008b esp. 278-279). This account 
requires that basic inference is not itself a matter of thinking ‘Pattern X is blameless; this 
step is in accord with pattern X; so I may take this step’. 
35
 Peacocke 1992 6-8. 
36
 Compare Velleman 2007 xii-xv. 
37
 This is Campbell’s view in his 2002. For other classical proposals see Brewer 1999; 
Smithies forthcoming.  
38
 See Campbell 2002 13-19 for the initial claim about causal underpinning; 3, 16, 26, 34-
38, 41-43, 55-56, 87-88 for the claim that conscious attention defines the target of the 
perceptual information-processing it causes; 22-26, 84-90 for the relation between causal 
and normative underpinning and reference. 
39
 This is in step with ‘cold control’ accounts of hypnosis, according to which a hypnotic 
‘trigger’ activates sub-personal routines without mediation by personal level mechanisms 
for intentional action. See Dienes and Perner 2007. 
40
 The question of the exact relation between awareness and harnessability by 
representational intention is a topic for future work. 
41
 Compare Campbell 2002 10: ‘…experiential highlighting…affects the functional role 
of … experience of [an object]…It means that you are in a position to keep track of [it] 
deliberately over time, you are in a position to answer questions about [it] on the basis of 
vision, and you are now able to act with respect to [it]’; similar at 3, 19, 28, 42-43. Note 
that this is a point about difference in richness of capacities, not difference in richness of 
information delivered: 9-10.  For the claim that, there is selection without attention, but it 
cannot underpin demonstrative reference see 4, 31-34, 51-57, 142-145. 
42
 For example, Campbell says that attention but not mere selection enables ‘intentional 
interrogation’ of the environment (3, 27, 33-34, 89); that attention but not mere selection 
enables intentional action on an object (27, 48-49, 89); and that attention but not mere 
selection makes available the ‘categorical thing itself’ (10, ch. 7 esp. 137-145, ch. 8 esp. 
250-254). Though it is not possible to argue this point here, I think these differences are 
part of what an account of why mere selection cannot secure perceptual demonstrative 
reference must explain, rather than resources for the explanation. Objections to Campbell 
on the ground that merely selective processing can be focussed are also raised by Siegel 
2004 429; Smithies forthcoming §2.  
43
 Searle 1994 especially 14-15, 28-29, 54-55, 89-93. 
 29 
                                                 
44
 I suggest that the best interpretation of Tractatus 3.2-3.261 is as providing something 
like the argument for iii below. Russell states a similar argument at xiii of his 
introduction to the Tractatus, and the argument’s ingredients occur throughout his logical 
atomist writings (see Russell 1956 230 for a version of (i); 197 for a version of (ii)). 
45
 Campbell proposes that different ‘styles’ of attention (involving different ways of 
binding features) enable reference to different categories of object. For example, he says 
that you are attending in different styles when you attend to a person, a cloud or a valley. 
(2002 ch. 4 especially 61-63; 70; 74-75; 82). In these terms, the current problem concerns 
cases where a thing’s behaviour enables you to attend to it in a style inappropriate to its 
category. 
 
